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Abstract 
The banking debacle of 2007/2008 and the Greek sovereign debt crisis have witnessed that forecasts of government 
balances play a major role for how participants in financial markets assess the sustainability of government budget 
deficits. But how do forecasters form their government-balance forecasts? Do forecasters deliver unbiased forecasts? 
Our results imply that they do not. On the contrary, using more than 100,000 forecasts of government balances for 38 
countries we report strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding, i.e. forecaster scatter their projections around the 
consensus forecast.
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1. Introduction
Forecasts of government balances are of major importance for how market participants'
form their expectations of future tax policy and government spending. Moreover, the
banking debacle of 2007/2008 and the Greek sovereign debt crisis have witnessed that
forecasts of government balances play a major role for how participants in nancial
markets assess the sustainability of government budget decits. Assessments of sus-
tainability of government budget decits, in turn, are likely to be mirrored in the risk
premiums on government bonds (Nickel et al., 2011). But how do forecasters form
their government-balance forecasts? And, given the major importance of forecasts of
government balances for nancial and economic developments, do forecasters deliver
unbiased forecasts?
We used a new empirical test developed by Bernhard et al. (2006) to analyze these
questions. As compared to tests advanced in earlier literature, this new test has the
advantage that it is robust to, for example, unexpected common shocks, optimism
and pessimism among forecasters and inaccurate measurement of the forecast target.
We used more than 100,000 forecasts of government balances for 38 countries to
implement the test. Our empirical results indicate that forecasters do not deliver
unbiased forecasts of government balances. We document that biased forecasts are likely
to reect anti-herding of forecasters. Anti-herding arises if forecasts are biased away
from the consensus forecast, indicating that, for strategic or other reasons, forecasters
intentionally scatter their forecasts around the consensus forecast.
To the best of our knowledge, the empirical test developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006)
has not yet been used to study forecasts of government balances. Recent applications of
their empirical test focus on forecasts of German stock analysts (Naujoks et al., 2009)
and oil-price forecasts (Pierdzioch et al., 2010).1 Because we are the rst to apply
the test developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) to the study of forecasts of government
balances, we describe the empirical test in detail in Section 2. We introduce the survey
data that we used in our empirical research together with our empirical results in Section
3. We oer some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. A Test of Forecast Scattering
The test developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) uses the insight that, given an information
set available at the time a forecast is made, forecasters should form in period t a
median-unbiased private forecast of government balances in period t + k.2 This private
forecast is denoted by ~ Ei;t[st+k], where i denotes a forecaster index. Accordingly, the
probability that an unbiased private forecast exceeds (is less than) future realized
1In earlier literature, regressions of actual values of a variable on forecasts have often been used to
test for rationality and unbiasedness of forecasts. See Keane and Runkle (1990), Song et al. (1995),
Aggarwal and Mohanty (2000), among others. Elliott et al. (2008) argue that such regressions do not
discriminate between irrational forecasts and forecasts derived from an asymmetric loss function. The
test developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) does not depend upon a specic forecaster loss function. As
regards scal forecasts, Melander et al. (2007) study whether the scal and other forecasts of the EU
commission are biased.
2The index k denotes the forecasting horizon expressed in months (with k = 12;11;:::;1 for current-
year forecasts, and k = 24;23;:::;13 for next-year forecasts).
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government balances, st+k, should be equal to 0:5. As a result, the probability that
future realized government balances overshoot (undershoot) the unbiased private forecast
should not be linked to the consensus (average) forecast,  Et[st+k].
Herding arises if a published forecast is biased towards the consensus forecast. In
this case, the published biased forecast, Ei;t[st+k], is positioned between ~ Ei;t[st+k] and
 Et[st+k]. It follows that, if the biased published forecast exceeds the consensus forecast,
the probability that the biased public forecast also exceeds future realized government
balances should be smaller than 0:5. By the same token, the probability that the
published biased forecast is less than future realized government balances should be
smaller than 0:5 if a biased published forecast is less than the consensus forecast. In
contrast, anti-herding can be recovered from probabilities that are larger than 0:5
because, in this case, a forecasters' public forecast is biased away from the consensus
forecast.
Regardless of the consensus forecast, if published forecasts of government balances are
unbiased, the conditional probability, P, that future realized government balances under-
shoot (overshoot) an unbiased published forecast should be 0:5, implying
P(st+k < Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] >  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k]) = 0:5; (1)
P(st+k > Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] <  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k]) = 0:5: (2)
In the case of herding, a forecaster publishes forecasts that are biased towards the con-
sensus forecast, and the probability of undershooting is less than 0:5, given a published
forecast that exceeds the consensus forecast. In a similar vein, if the biased published
forecast is less than the consensus forecast, then the probability of overshooting should
also be less than 0:5. We get
P(st+k < Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] >  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k] < 0:5; (3)
P(st+k > Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] <  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k]) < 0:5: (4)
If forecasters anti-herd, in contrast, the two conditional probabilities should be larger
than 0:5. We have:
P(st+k < Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] >  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k] > 0:5; (5)
P(st+k > Ei;t[st+k]jEi;t[st+k] <  Et[st+k];st+k 6= Ei;t[st+k]) > 0:5: (6)
The test statistic, S, is computed as the average of the sample estimates of the two
conditional probabilities. The test statistic, S, has an asymptotic normal distribution.
The null hypothesis is that forecasters form unbiased forecasts. If forecasters form
unbiased forecasts, the test statistic should assume the value S = 0:5. If forecasters
herd, the test statistic should assume a value S < 0:5. If forecasters anti-herd, the test
statistic should assume a value S > 0:5.
Bernhardt et al. (2006) show that systematic optimism or pessimism of forecasters do
not distort the test statistic, S. Systematic pessimism raises (lowers) the conditional
probability that future realized government balances exceed (fall short of) forecasts of
government balances. The shift in the conditional probabilities, however, does not aect
2560Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 No. 3 pp. 2558-2568
the test statistic, S, which is dened as the average of the two conditional probabilities.
The averaging of the two conditional probabilities further implies that the test statistic
does not depend on whether forecasters target the median or the mean of an asymmetric
distribution over future realized government balances. The variance of the test statistic,
S, attains a maximum under the null hypothesis of unbiased forecasts of government
balances, implying that the test statistic, S, is conservative insofar as, under the null
hypothesis, one maximizes the diculty to reject the null hypothesis of unbiased forecasts.
3. Data and Empirical Results
We analyzed the monthly Consensus Economics survey data of government-balance fore-
casts for 38 countries. Our sample of countries includes industrialized countries, Asian
countries, Eastern European countries, and Latin American countries. The sample pe-
riod ends in December 2010, but the start of the sample period diers across countries.
While the government balance forecasts for the industrialized countries have been pub-
lished since March 1993, for other countries like Slovakia or Ukraine the survey started in
March 2010 only. In total, we used in our empirical analysis more than 100;000 forecasts
made by more than 1,800 forecasters.3 Survey data are available for two dierent forecast
horizons, that is, for the current year and the next year.4
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the cross-sectional average of forecasts (dashed lines), the actual
government balances (solid lines) taken from the IMF International Financial Statistic,
and the cross-sectional scattering of forecasts as measured by the cross-sectional range of
forecasts (shaded areas). While the variables for the industrialized and Asian countries
are forecasted in national currency, the variables for the other countries are forecasted
as a percentage of GDP. The cross-sectional average of forecasts (that is, the consensus
forecast) moves in tandem with actual government balance. The scattering of forecasts
around the consensus forecast, however, is substantial. For example, for the United
States (the Euro area) the May 2009 forecasts ranged from bn. $  810 to bn. $  2;410
(bn. e  365 to bn. e  700). The cross-sectional scattering of forecasts is largest during
the nancial crisis of 2007=2008.
The results given in Table 1 suggest that anti-herding of forecasters may help to explain
the cross-sectional scattering of forecasts. The test statistic, S, signicantly exceeds
0:5 in the vast majority of countries, irrespective of whether one considers current
year or next year forecasts. In other words, our results provide strong evidence of
anti-herding of forecasters.5 Interestingly, the anti-herding behavior is signicantly
3A short sample period does not lead to statistical problems because the test statistic, S, is computed
from the cross-section of forecasts. The forecasters participating in the survey work for institutions such
as investment banks, large international corporations, economic research institutes, and at universities
located in the respective country. A complete list of participants is available upon request.
4For some countries, like, the UK, the U.S., and India, the forecasts are for the scal year while for
other countries the forecasts are for the calendar year. For the industrialized countries and the Asian
countries the forecasts are in national currency. For the Eastern European European countries and the
Latin American countries forecasts are expressed relative to GDP.
5Because forecasters simultaneously issue forecasts, we used the lagged consensus forecast to compute
the test statistic. To this end, we combined forecasts such that the forecasting horizons of current-year
forecasts exactly match the forecasting horizon of next-year forecasts. For January forecasts, we used the
next-year forecast of the preceding period. The lagged next-year consensus forecast is in the information
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stronger for the Asian and Latin American countries while relatively less pronounced for
the industrialized countries.
Insert Table 1 about here.
In order to study the link between forecast accuracy and anti-herding, we calculated
the forecaster-specic Root Mean Squared Error, RMSEi. We then computed the test
statistic, Si for every forecaster. Finally, we estimated the correlation coecient between
the two variables. For all regions, we nd a negative correlation of anti-herding with
forecast errors (Table 2). However, this correlation is statistically signicant on a 95
% condence level only for the industrialized countries. Furthermore, the size of the
correlation coecients point into the direction of a very loose relationship. Thus, while
scal forecasts scatter, anti-herding does not necessarily lead to less accurate forecasts.
Insert Table 2 about here.
4. Conclusions
Anti-herding of scal forecasters leads to a scattering of forecasts around the consensus
forecast. The negative correlation between anti-herding and forecast errors shows that
anti-herding forecasters are not less \successful" in statistical terms than forecasters who
track the consensus forecast. In economic terms, the success of a forecaster depends on
a forecaster's loss function, and forecast accuracy may be only one of several arguments
in the loss function. For example, Laster et al. (1999) construct a model in which
forecasters are endowed with the same information set, the same believes about the
\correct" forecasting model, and the same loss function. Forecasts are made for two
types of customers. The rst group of customers regularly consumes forecasts and is
interested in an accurate forecast. The second group of customers only occasionally
use forecasts. They take into consideration only the performance of a forecaster in the
last forecasting cycle. The larger the inuence of the occasional users, the stronger
the incentive to deviate from the consensus forecast because if '...forecasters are paid
according to relative ability, they might scatter, since it is hard to win when making a
forecast similar to others" (Lamont 2002, p.268).
set of forecasters when making current-year forecasts, and the forecasting horizon is identical for the
lagged forecasts and the contemporaneous forecasts.
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Figure 1: Expected and Actual Government Balance
Panel A: Industrialized Countries
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Panel B: Eastern European Countries
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forecast range
mean expected government balance, Et[st+k]
actual government balance, (st+k)
This gure shows the mean of the short-term forecasts of the government balance (dashed line), the actual government
balance (solid line), and the forecast range (shaded area) in national currency (Industrialized Countries) or as % of GDP
(Eastern European Countries). The vertical distance between the mean forecast and the actual government balance captures
the forecast error.
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Figure 2: Expected and Actual Government Balance
Panel C: Latin American Countries
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Panel D: Asian Countries
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This gure shows the mean of the short-term forecasts of the government balance (dashed line), the actual government
balance (solid line), and the forecast range (shaded area) in national currency (Asian countries) or as % of GDP (Latin
American Countries). The vertical distance between the mean forecast and the actual government balance captures the
forecast error.
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